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Abstract
In a knowledge-based economy, knowledge has
become the most important source for competitive
advantage. Thus, organizations spend more attention
on the protection of knowledge and also research on
knowledge protection has gained increasing attention
in the past years. However, knowledge protection
research mainly focuses on the design of preventive
measures and little is published about real incidents
or reactive measures. Learning from failure and from
incidents is important to improve current practice.
This paper reflects on four cases of real knowledge
risk incidents. We discuss ways to prevent or delay
knowledge spillovers and the importance of knowing
the threats in order to prevent them. In addition to
preventive measures, we highlight that companies
need to have reactive measures in place. Finally,
based on our insights we discuss why analyzing
incidents in addition to identified threats is important
for practice as well as academia.

1. Introduction
Researchers widely acknowledge that knowledge
is strategically the most significant resource and
therefore needs to be protected [22] from loss,
obsolescence, unauthorized exposure, unauthorized
modification, and erroneous assimilation [14]
Scholars argue, that firms’ competitive advantages
depend on their ability to protect their critical
knowledge [24]. Hence, the importance of knowledge
protection is widely emphasized and its strategic
nature is exposed [26].
Despite general remarks why knowledge
protection is important, not much is published about
real consequences of the realization of knowledge
risks. For the risk of losing knowledge inside the
company, e.g., due to employee retirement, studies try
to quantify the impact of knowledge loss and suggest
that knowledge loss causes organizational problems
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like low productivity or reduced moral [31], others
investigate the relationship between knowledge loss
and performance [25] or the skills of responsible staff
[19]. Also for risk of losing reputation some studies
can be found [e.g. 36, 42]. Of the risk of unwanted
knowledge spillovers and thus the risk of losing the
exclusiveness of knowledge very little is known of the
actual consequences of risk incidents. Scholars
describe the impact in general terms, like “competitors
use this knowledge to gain competitive advantage” [9]
or assume that the impact is obvious, like
“consequences are easy to imagine” [10] and thus does
not need to be described further. Although it may be
easy to imagine different consequences, learning from
incidents requires describing and analyzing the
consequences in detail.
Reporting about concrete failures is frequently
avoided as this is connotated with a blaming and hence
it is difficult to investigate concrete incidents. This is
particularly true for knowledge risks as they have a
strong link to the competitiveness of the company due
to the strategic and competitive importance of
knowledge. Research shows that managers assume
reporting about such incidents will have negative
effects on investors and the firm's reputation [35].
Despite the challenges, it seems that investigating
real knowledge risk incidents provide an important
research opportunity on the one hand and has a high
relevance for practice on the other hand. In general,
systematic research on failure provides valuable
insights for research as well as for practice [13]. This
leads to the research question of this paper:
RQ: What are concrete knowledge risk incidents
and what can we learn from such incidents?
To answer the research question, the authors first
review the existing literature on knowledge protection
with a focus on knowledge risk incidents. Based on
this review the authors conduct a secondary data
analysis of interview material collected in three studies
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focusing on knowledge protection. After presenting
four cases in which a knowledge risk materializes,
lessons learned for research as well as for practice are
discussed.

2. Related work
Knowledge protection is defined as the collection
of the formal practices that organizations enforce and
the informal practices that individuals perform to
prevent unwanted disclosure, spillover, or loss of
knowledge [38].
From this definition we can derive that knowledge
risks (that the protection is done to prevent) are linked
to incidents, where knowledge is disclosed, leaked or
lost. According to Durst & Zieba [10] knowledge risk
is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse
effects of any activities engaging or related somehow
to knowledge that can affect the functioning of an
organization on any level. This leads us to define a
knowledge risk incident as an knowledge-related
event that disrupts the functioning of an organization
or its competitive position.
There is a number of articles that concentrate on
reviewing the past research on knowledge protection
and knowledge risks [e.g. 10, 16, 27]. These reviews
more or less agree that there is much to do especially
in terms of empirical work in this area. Understanding
knowledge risks and the consequences of them
ultimately requires understanding real world incidents,
but empirical work on the topic is scarce; a lot of the
work so far has been conceptual or theoretical in
nature [8].
In addition to focusing on the definitions of
knowledge risks, the conceptual approaches to
knowledge risk management or knowledge protection
range from management frameworks [e.g. 18, 32, 40]
and conceptual models [e.g. 12, 26]; collections of
measures [39] to taxonomies [10, 41]. Most
conceptual works propose frameworks supporting the
understanding of the complex phenomenon called
knowledge risk audits better management in
organizations. A lot of the focus in the management
frameworks is on understanding, preventing or
avoiding knowledge risk incidents [17, 30].
The perspective of continuity planning that is
present in the information security management
literature [e.g. 6, 34] is not so much regarded in
knowledge risk literature. A focus on continuity
planning would encourage preparing for what to do in
case of an incident happens [34]. However, the
knowledge risk frameworks that draw on the
information security neglect this aspect so far. The
cyclical nature of the management processes can be
interpreted to aim for learning from incidents and

preparing for them in the future, but the actual
continuity planning efforts are scarcely addressed in
literature [e.g. 15, 32]. Continuity planning in the
knowledge risk domain is instead brought up mainly
in the context of employee turnover [4, 20, 33]
Most of the empirical studies that concern
knowledge risks aim to understand the perceptions on
knowledge risks or on existing management practices
of organizations. The range of methods used to
achieve this general goal is broad [8]. The expectation
in the empirical work is to discover how organizations
protect their knowledge, and what they have done to
proactively mitigate knowledge risks.
The perspective of learning from failures [11] is
not much present in the papers, although incidents may
be discussed as a motivation for the papers [e.g. 1].
This does not necessarily mean that the organizations
do not strive to learn from failures. However, it either
indicates lack of willingness to discuss this with
researchers, or lack of interest for failure from
researchers, or both. For example, a google scholar
search for “knowledge risk incident” or “knowledge
loss incident” or “knowledge risk failure” at the time
of writing this paper provides no results. Although a
systematic review with a wide range of search terms
would be needed to locate all possible discussions of
knowledge risk incidents that may have been
published, at present it seems, that they are not much
willingly discussed in the open, even as anonymous
case studies.
The most interesting part of the definition of
knowledge risk we use in this paper, is the “severity of
adverse effects”, or in other terms, the consequences
of knowledge risk incidents. For example, Ilvonen et
al. [16] present a classification of knowledge risks and
protection management mechanisms, but don’t really
touch on the consequences of knowledge risk
incidents. Massingham [30] goes more to the direction
of assessing the consequences, but also this approach
leaves the consequences vague. An integral part of
management, however, is the decision making of how
much money is spent on different activities, and why.
Thalmann et al. [40] propose a risk management
framework inspired from IT-risk management: how to
design and implement countermeasures and how to
check if all measures are in place. In this and other
similar research it is assumed that the measures are
effective in preventing knowledge risk realization.
One aspect of knowledge risks defined above is
knowledge loss. Knowledge loss due to leaving
employees is one of the more studied areas connected
to knowledge risks [e.g. 18, 23, 31]. Even in this
domain studying the impact of knowledge risk
incidents empirically is scarce [e.g. 31] and the
perspective of response is lacking.
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Research on real incidents is important to better
understand the nature of knowledge risk itself and to
investigate the effectiveness of organizational risk
management frameworks. The authors acknowledge
that investigating real incidents is challenging as this
is a sensitive topic, however it is important for further
developing the research on knowledge risks. As
knowledge risk management is heavily inspired by
information security management [19], we should also
follow the research tradition of information security
management and rigorously investigate and learn from
incidents.

3. Method
This paper presents a secondary analysis [37] of three
studies focusing on knowledge risks and knowledge
protection conducted between 2012 and 2018.
Although secondary analysis as a research method is
more widely used in the health care sector [37],
especially because it is suitable for studying sensitive
issues, it is sometimes used also in Information
Systems research e.g. [2, 5].
As the perspective of learning from knowledge risk
incidents rose as an interesting perspective to us, we
went back to our previous interview materials, and
further analyzed the scarce mentions of knowledge
risk incidents present in our interview transcripts.
We had asked about knowledge risk realization in
all our three interview studies, but only very few
interviewees answered directly. Most of the
interviewees avoided the issue and answered on
abstract levels and we focused the interview
discussion on other knowledge risk aspects as risk
incidents were not the focus of the study at the time.
The interviewees who talked about the incidents were
also concerned about linking an incident directly with
their company. Hence, after re-coding of the
transcripts we realized that risk realization is a highly
sensitive topic.
Overall, we re-analyzed three studies with a total
of 129 interviewees (see table 1 for details). All
interviews were recorded and transcribed and had a
focus on knowledge protection and knowledge risks
and were analyzed, i.e. coded previously by one of the
authors. For the purpose of this paper, we recoded the
interviews focusing on knowledge risk realization and
incidents. Due to different interview languages, i.e.
English, Finnish and German every author coded the
interviews he or she conducted, and we had various
synchronization meetings about the emerged code
set´s. Finally, we identified four cases where an actual
incident and the consequences were discussed by the
interviewees.

Table 1. Interview material
ID

No
of
Interviewees

duration

Countries

Year
conducted

#1

7

avg 55
minutes

FI

2012

#2

91

avg 62
minutes

AT,
UK

DE,

2013
and 2014

#3

31

avg 40
minutes

AT,
CH,
DE, IT, PT

2017
and 2018

Our experience as researchers is that knowledge
protection is a topic that organizations treat with
caution and are not willing to disclose detailed
information about concrete incidents and in particular
about their impact. In fact, in some cases the condition
for agreeing to the interview has been that details of
what has happened in the organization are not
discussed. Despite the shortcomings of the data, the
cases that are presented in this paper warrant attention.

4. Four cases of incidents
Based on our analysis we present four cases: case
4.1 has is origin in study #3, case 4.2 and 4.3 in study
#2 and case 4.4. in study #1.

4.1 Violation of trust
The first case considers the trust between
organizations, and the consequent risk that this trust is
violated. In this case a small tool manufacturer shared
details of a product (construction plans) and also
production details with a large enterprise that was also
one of its main customers. The tool manufacturer
shared many details of its products with the large
enterprise, because of a long and successful business
relationship and due to the high importance (revenue
share) of this big customer. But the interviewee
described what happens if you do not spend enough
efforts into protection:
“No no it’s worthwhile to take any action to
protect. It’s worthwhile. For example, one of our
<name of tool> was copied in China. But
unfortunately, this was due to some un-loyal
customer. So, you cannot … when talking about
trust it’s that …a customer asked [this company in
China] to copy one of our tools to buy it cheaper.
So when you have this kind of customers … you are
completely defeated. So, you cannot do anything.
You can only react. […] But … also after this fact
that happened, so we are very sensitive to any kind
of information we give outside. Very sensitive.”
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The interviewee also concluded that collaboration
with trust and without protection might be the best
basis for a fruitful knowledge-based collaboration, but
a company should never solely rely on trust as they
then have no other measures to react.
“If I trust the other party and I don’t expect
surprises, so very honest very clear and so on, I
believe that for me it is the best way of getting the
maximum output of the collaboration. […] but not
just be to open, you know […] I am not talking
about the Open Kimono approach, okay? I don’t
know if you understand what I’m talking about
when I say Open Kimono. Japanese they say Open
Kimono it means that usually Japanese they are
naked under the Kimono. So when they open the
Kimono they show them completely naked.”
Within the interview it became clear that the
incident with the un-loyal customer really shaped the
mind of the interviewee and consequently the mindset
of the company. The situation of not having the control
over the process and the perception that “you can only
react”, really made him and his company more careful.
Additionally, to the financial losses, this insecurity
around the case required massive management
attention and caused a massive cognitive load to all
involved people. Hence, he and his company are very
keen of maintaining control and not to be “naked under
the kimono” anymore.

4.2 Spillover
In our second case, concerning knowledge
spillover, the owner of a small electrical engineering
company reported about an innovation he made to
control the bacteria within a pig breeding ventilation
system. The control mechanism ensured that the
bacteria in the air ventilation reduced the smell of the
pigs significantly, which enhanced the acceptance of
pig breeding in the area. The electrical engineer was
fully aware that this control mechanism was an
important competitive advantage in the market, and he
acquired lots of lucrative contracts based on this
technology.
“The control mechanism for the chemicals and
the bacteria was key and we protected the
knowledge in such a way that nobody can get it.
This is crucial, because apart from the control the
rest of the installation is trivial and anybody can
do this. But the contract is coupled, and we did this
four years more or less exclusively in northern
Germany.”
To secure this knowledge, he actively protected
this knowledge by applying technical measures such
as encryption, he instructed his employees and talked
very carefully about this innovation. Additionally, the

company also applied measures to make reverse
engineering more challenging as well as measures to
confuse his competitors. He was very aware of the
threat and of the main competitors:
“Dominantly we used technical measures, like
encryption but we also added additional things to
the control unit to make reverse engineering more
challenging. Secrecy was strictly enforced, and we
also tried to confuse our competitors by spreading
fake information. But if you have a competitive
advantage in the market, your competitors will try
everything to get it and what you can do is to gain
time by such measures.”
He was successful with his knowledge protection
strategy, but after four years the competitors were able
to reverse engineer the control mechanism. The
contract volume of 500.000€ per year (which is
substantial for an SME with 20 employees) has since
diminished
“We defended this exclusive knowledge "tooth
and nail" for four years, which secured us ½
million € revenue each year. But now the
knowledge is out, and we don't get the contracts
anymore. Because other companies are cheaper or
more close to the customer.”
This shows clearly that knowledge protection pays
off and that knowledge spillover can result in concrete
financial losses. We also asked the owner of this
construction company about patenting:
“Patenting is something for large enterprises
having lots of money and tough lawyers. If I patent
this control mechanism it is away, as I have to
make this mechanism publicly available. Others
could adapt this easily and I do not have the money
to fight a lawsuit and the success is also
questionable.”
Hence, the interviewee clearly described the
limitation of formal legal protection measures for
process knowledge and especially the challenge of
enforcing legal measures as a small company.

4.3 Immature Idea
The third case considers the complex risks related
to immature ideas. In this case an innovation manager
from a small company operating in the field of medical
engineering reported about an incident. He had an idea
how to construct an implant in a more robust way, but
he needed process knowledge how to create suitable
molds for the product. Thus, he joined a network
meeting of his local network dealing with life science
topics. Many different companies from the region
interested in the topic participated and he talked with
several experts from the material sciences.
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“Talking with people from other domains is
usually most interesting, you get fresh ideas and
for some innovative projects you just need other
partners, especially as a small company.”
Intentionally (to protect the idea), he never
explained his new idea in detail, but asked questions.
His strategy was to discuss on a high level with the
other companies in order to identify the right partner
for implementation. He was convinced that without
specific knowledge about the application domain of
the implant the idea was protected.
“If you talk with your competitors from your
domain, they have more or less the same mindset
and background knowledge. We will understand
soon. If you discuss your idea with people from
other fields, sure - you have to be careful, but it's
unlikely that they will understand and even if they
understand the idea, it's unlikely that they will
exploit your idea.”
However, there was also a competitor in the room
who had a trusted relationship with one of the material
sciences companies. This person talked with his friend
and they discovered the idea of the innovation
manager.
“However, never say never! In this case I
talked with a material science guy and he was
extremely interested and very competent. He had
lots of good ideas and comments and talked more
and more. It is a giving and taking and you get trust
over time, and of course I wanted to find a
collaboration partner for implementing my idea.
But he had already a working relationship with one
of my competitors and yes the idea was away!”
The interviewee explained that he balanced
knowledge sharing and protection in a sense that if he
perceived a good return, he would also disclose more
knowledge. This on the one hand because he wants to
push the discussion, and on the other hand because he
wanted to build trust during the conversation.
However, the wiggle room is not so big for ideas as he
explained:
“You know an idea has not so many details you
can hide - it is like a raw egg with a soft skin. You
have to find the solution way - the shell, it is the
novelty and exclusiveness which counts for an
idea.”
As he reflects, an idea is very sensitive and like a
raw egg. The complexity is very low, in this context
you cannot hide many details and hence it is relatively
easy for a knowledgeable expert to grasp the core idea.
The other person together with the material science
company finally pushed the idea to a product and the
innovation manager was not able to monetize his idea.

“They did it! I did not manage to find a suitable
partner in time and finally they exploited the idea
first.”
Because of the market structure and the size of the
company he did not follow-up on this idea and it was
a lost opportunity for the company.

4.4 Turnover
The last case we discuss is turnover of employees.
Employee turnover can have multiple reasons, and this
was a theme that was widely discussed in some of the
interviews. However, the discussion of actual
incidents caused by turnover in more detail was not so
common. In this section we bring out two incident
situations: retirement of a long-term manager, and an
unexpected death of an employee.
“there is always a threat that knowledge will
leave the company. … We don’t have a solid chain
of supervisors who would think about knowledge
[and its continuance]. We have a project
organization, and the project manager does not
necessarily think about the knowledge from the
development point of view as much as from the
user point of view”
As this interview quote from a middle-sized
company highlights, the risks linked to knowledge
turnover need to be identified. If the managers are not
interested in the long-term development of the
organization, they do not necessarily focus on the
importance of individual employees to the long-term
survival of the organization. The situation is particular
challenging when the person leaving is the person who
should do the identification: when the manager leaves.
This happened in the interviewed company.
“There is actually only one person who knows
all our customers and how to do business with
them, and the customer entity. And now when this
person is going to retire, we have established this
sort of master-apprentice setting to approach this
problem. The apprentice will follow along for
almost a year. And this is done solely because of
the knowledge. On account of the person who is
retiring, I don’t think there is a single document
about what he has been doing for the past [few]
years”
In the company the retiring senior manager had
clearly managed to recruit the right people and despite
shortcomings in his own documentation process,
instilled an attitude of protecting the organization
against turnover and stagnation, since the same
interviewees highlighted the importance of change in
work roles.
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“there is this thing called the half-life of a
manager. In five years, their efficiency will halve.
In five years, they get stuck in routines and stop
creating new things, so it is also not good to have
one person in the same position as long as possible
and in that way be efficient”
Perhaps nowadays the company has learned from
the painful process of replacing the retired manager
and foster the attitude described in the latter quote of
need for change in manager roles regularly.
The first risk linked to knowledge loss because of
turnover is that knowledge is lost and not usable for
the benefit of the organization. The second risk linked
to turnover is too little of it, which can lead to
stagnation and knowledge decay. Even if people stay
in the same organization, their role should be renewed
every now and then, so that they are “forced” to learn
new things and teach things to others. In the case of
the retiring manager, it may be that the organization
suffers from both: first, the manager being stuck in
their routines for a long time, and thus declining in
their creativity and productivity, and second, the
manager leaving and causing a lot of effort to transfer
their knowledge before retirement.
The risk of a leaving employee is easier to tackle if
there is time to prepare and the retiring person is
available for knowledge transfer. Sometimes,
however, employees are lost unexpectedly to accidents
or illness, which happened in another company.
“One very experienced designer died. We have
missed the knowledge that he had. At least you
realize [the value] when you don’t have [the
knowledge] anymore.”
In a case like this, if the valuable knowledge has
not been identified, and the presence of the people has
been taken for granted, there is little that can be done
as a reaction. Proactive knowledge identification and
transfer is the only means of mitigating risks like this,
and hence, learning from the incident for future is
essential.

5. Discussion of results
The analysis of our four cases shows that
knowledge risk incidents can have serious effects for
companies and that both preventive and reactive
measures are justified. Even if none of the four
companies got bankrupt, the effects are serious. In the
spill-over case the owner made very clear estimations
about the loss, but at the same time also highlights that
his strict knowledge protection measures of the last
four years secured additional revenues. Thus, for him
the knowledge protection measures clearly paid off
and he could assign 500.000€ revenue to his measures
per year.

For the violation of trust case, the interviewee
described the incident as very critical as it affected a
major product of the company. Even if he could not
quantify the loss, he made clear that this was an
existential threat. This is like the turnover case, in
which the impact is clear and serious but difficult to
quantify. In the immature idea case, a business
opportunity is lost. The risk is more focused on future
business than on the current business and thus difficult
to quantify. Despite the challenge, the interviewee
made clear that this was an important business
opportunity and that he should have given more
attention to protection.
A second important insight of our analysis is that it
is important to know the potential threat, or for the first
three cases, to know the potential attacker well. The
ancient war-related proverb, made famous by Sun Tzu,
“know yourself, know your enemy” is thus highly
relevant also for dealing with knowledge risks. In the
spill-over case, the owner had a very clear idea who
would be the attacker and he designed the measures
accordingly. One of the main reasons for successfully
hiding the knowledge for four years was the adept
competitor analysis.
In contrast to this, not understanding the potential
attacker caused the incidents in the violation of trust as
well as the immature idea case. In the violation of trust
case the company simply did not anticipate that their
big customer would forward the knowledge to a
Chinese competitor. Similar in the immature idea case,
here the interviewee did not expect that his
conversation partner would exploit the idea. In both
cases, the interviewee said that a more rigorous
analysis of their sharing partners could have helped to
avoid these incidents, which is in line with literature
[e.g. 29, 41]. However, the emphasis here is on the
word could. In addition to helping in preventing the
incidents from happening, analyzing the situation
beforehand to create a plan in case the spillover or
violation of trust happens, might have helped the
organizations with their recovery.
In the turnover case, it seems clear that knowing
the threat in advance allows to take suitable
countermeasures, i.e. distributing the critical
knowledge to other employees. Retirement as an
unavoidable knowledge loss incident has also received
a lot of attention in the literature [e.g. 8, 18]. Despite
this attention, and an older case, we argue that
acknowledging this threat could be done more
promptly in many organizations. Although there are
literature that discuss the importance of threat
assessment also in connection with knowledge [8, 15,
16, 41], the term threat is often linked to sources that
come from outside the organization. In case of
turnover, the threat and “attack” comes from inside.
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Although natural and unavoidable, employee turnover
needs to be also seen as a threat, so that proper
measures and reaction plans can be put in place.
Our cases also show that knowing the competitors
and taking preventive measures does not always help
to avoid a knowledge risk incident at all. In the spillover case the owner was fully aware that he will not be
able to protect the knowledge forever, but the
prevention of the spillover for two years was a success
for him. Hence, delaying knowledge risk incidents can
be a reasonable goal for knowledge protection
strategy, as is also discussed in literature [e.g. 1].
The goal of delaying as the goal of knowledge
protection is important as it also influences the design
of the protection measures. Thus, not only the
knowledge itself, the threat and the potential attacker
are important decision variables, but also the
protection extent and the protection period. Regarding
the knowledge itself, the immature idea case clearly
showed that the suitability of protection measures
depends on the maturity of knowledge. As immature
knowledge is less complex, it is more challenging to
leave details out as a protection strategy [3]. Hence,
the analysis of the communication partner is even
more important and sharing with less-proximate
sharing partners is one suitable protection strategy for
immature knowledge [28].
Our analysis of the related work showed that
knowledge risk and protection literature mainly focus
on preventive strategies and measures so far. Our four
cases also provided evidence for the suitability of this
approach. However, the analysis of all four cases also
shows a need for reactive measures having a clear
after-incident strategy and a plan if a knowledge risk
incident happens.
In the turnover case, the interviewee reported about
the frustrating experience of managing the knowledge
loss and how his company was now damned to
reactions to the competitor instead of setting proactive
actions. In this case it became also clear that only a
good strategy to block the sequences of the unwanted
knowledge spillover prevented the company from
really serious consequences.
In the spillover and the immature idea case, both
had no reaction plan. For the spillover case this was
not intended as delaying was the goal. Nevertheless, it
is not clear if countermeasures would have
additionally delayed the knowledge assimilation by
competitors. For the immature idea case also no
strategy or plan was in place and thus the competitor
could exploit the idea easily. Even if the knowledge
protection literature rarely discusses “reaction plans”
for incidents, this is a standard procedure in other
related domains [34] and thus application of the

incident planning approach to knowledge risks could
draw on these domains.
In all four cases, the interviewees critically
reflected the cases with us in the interviews. But in
none of the four companies was a systematic “learning
from failure” procedure in place. In the turnover case
and the immature knowledge case, the interviewees
pointed very clearly out that they learned from the
incident and that they will draw conclusions from it.
In the turnover case it became clear that lessons
learned were also communicated within the
organization, but it is not clear if concrete measures or
organizational practices are implemented in response.
Based on our insights we argue for a systematic
investigation of knowledge risk incidents in research
as well as practice. Based on our secondary analysis of
interviews we were able to get new insights and it
seems that knowledge protection research would
benefit from more research in this direction.
Regarding the knowledge protection practice, we are
convinced that organizational knowledge protection
should also include a systematic approach to learn
from knowledge risk incidents. Related research
shows that organizational losses from incidents can be
reduced dramatically by focusing on the learning cycle
from incidents [7]. Hence, knowledge protection
frameworks and practices should be extended in this
regard.

6. Conclusion and Outlook
As a summary of the above analysis four main
conclusions are drawn:
1.) Knowledge risk incidents have a negative
impact on businesses, and thus preventive and
reactive measures are clearly justified. Further
research on real incidents could strengthen
this justification.
2.) Knowing the potential attacker and their
motivations is important for employing
successful preventive knowledge protection
measures. Competitor analysis thus becomes
also a tool for knowledge risk management,
not just business management in general.
3.) Some knowledge risk incidents are not
preventable, they can be merely delayed. A
knowledge protection strategy focusing on
delaying knowledge spillovers can be
economically justifiable.
4.) Planning for knowledge risk incidents is
important, so that organizations can recover
faster. One part of these plans should be a
process of learning from the incident, for the
further improvement of the knowledge
protection measures.
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Based on our findings from the analysis of the four
cases, we argue for more research on concrete
knowledge
incidents,
preventive
knowledge
protection measures and a research culture focusing on
learning from failure instead of repressing or
forgetting incidents. This seems especially relevant in
regard to emerging knowledge risks in data-centric
collaborations [16, 21].
One possible avenue for pursuing this research is
to locate organizations that have faced knowledge risk
incidents and study their responses to the incidents and
their learning from them. Although locating such
organizations may be difficult, the mandatory
reporting of privacy incidents and the response to them
in Europe may provide openings to locate potential
organizations. Based on this research, it seems
promising to develop reactive measures as part of
knowledge protection frameworks.
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